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The paper investigates some mechanisms of thought-experimenting, and 
explores the role of perspective taking, in particular of mental simula-
tion, in political thought-experiments, focusing for the most part on con-
tractualist ones. It thus brings together two blossoming traditions: the 
study of perspective taking and methodology of thought-experiments. 
How do contractualist thought-experiments work? Our moderately in-
fl ationist mental modelling proposal is that they mobilize our imagi-
native capacity for perspective taking, most probably perspective taking 
through simulation. The framework suggests the answers to questions 
that are often raised for other kinds of thought-experiments as well, con-
cerning their source of data, heuristic superiority to deduction, experi-
ential, qualitative character and ease in eliminating alternatives. In the 
case of contractualist political thought-experiments, the data come from 
perspective taking and the capacity to simulate. Mental simulation is 
way more accessible to subjects than abstract political reasoning from 
principles and facts. There is a new experience for the subject, the one of 
simulating. Simulation normally is quick and effortless; the simulator 
does not go through alternatives, but is constrained in an unconscious 
way. We distinguish two kinds of political thought-experiments and two 
manners of imagining political arrangements, building third-person 
mental models, and fi rst-person perspective taking. The two mecha-
nisms, the fi rst of inductive model building, the second for simulation, 
and their combination(s), exhaust the range of cognitive mechanism un-
derlying political thought-experimenting.
Keywords: Thought experiment, simulation, social contract, veil of 
ignorance.
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1. Introduction
A lot of thought experiments (TEs) requires the reader to take perspec-
tive on some morally, politically or legally relevant imagined situation; 
the Golden Rule TEs normally require one to take perspective on the 
victim’s situation, the Veil-of-ignorance TE to take perspective on pos-
sible social arrangements under the supposition that one is ignorant of 
her own material situation, abilities and the like.1 The topic of perspec-
tive-taking has become extremely popular in philosophy, psychology 
and related disciplines, in particular as far as its empathetic version is 
concerned.2 In this paper I shall explore the role of perspective taking 
in political TEs (for short “PTEs”). What is the actual cognitive mecha-
nism underlying the process? Here I shall opt for one particular, and 
rather popular view on perspective taking, namely that it crucially in-
volves mental simulation (see Goldman 2006). Goldman has, of course 
noticed, the connection to various TEs, in particular to Golden Rule 
and the Veil-of-ignorance ones (2006: 294), but has not been develop-
ing it much. So, the goal here is accounting for cognitive mechanism 
underlying political thought-experiments (PTEs), more narrowly upon 
the presently most popular variant, namely the contractualist ones, in 
the widest sense of the term, with authors like Rawls, Scanlon, Haber-
mas and Parfi t (see References) at the forefront. These experiments 
typically address any given issue about the moral and political status 
of some arrangement (say, the status of the right to privacy) by invit-
ing the reader to imagine a situation in which she is enabled to choose 
in the favor of it or against it, in her own name, and/or in the name 
of other people, under specifi ed circumstances. She might be asked to 
imagine having to persuade other people to accept her choice, and re-
fl ect about ways of doing it, and so on. At the end of the experiment, the 
reader is supposed to have arrived at intuition(s) concerning the issue, 
for instance that she would choose the arrangement under such-and-
such circumstances (say, under the Veil-of-ignorance), or that most 
people could not be persuaded to accept it, again under specifi ed cir-
cumstances. These intuitions are not themselves normative, they are 
factual intuitions about possible choices. However, they serve as the 
basis for further theory-building, which then results in normative con-
clusions, usually of moral-cum-political character. The question this 
paper is addressing is simple to state: Where do the intuitions come 
from? What is the possible psychological mechanism that produces the 
factual intuitions that serve as the basis for normative theory?
The framework for the answer shall be my moderately optimis-
tic, “defl ationist” as David Davies (2018) calls it, mental modelling 
1 The paper originated from a presentation at a conference in Geneva 8–9 June 
2017, on “Simulation and thought experiment”. I would like to thank prof. Marcel 
Weber for inviting me, and the participants for interesting and helpful discussion.
2 See chapters in Coplan and Goldie (2011) and Maibom (2017).
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approach.3 I agree with him about the characterization, and I thank 
him. A variant of it has been developed in detail, namely the one that 
concerns building a mental model from the third-person perspective. 
I hope it can account for PTEs like Plato’s Republic, where a group of 
young elite Athenians is supposed to imagine what life would be like 
for all sorts of people in a philosophers ruled state (Miščević 2012a) In 
general, it is suitable for imagining political arrangements, primarily 
from the third-person perspective. However, it does leave open the ac-
counting for a different kind of modelling, in which the experimenter 
is imagining social-political situations and arrangements, primarily 
from the fi rst—person perspective—the social contract (SC) tradition 
and its present-day form, with star author like Rawls, Scanlon, and 
Habermas. For this kind of thought experiments I want to propose a 
solution within the general framework of mental modelling, but stress-
ing a different kind of it: not building a model from the third person 
perspective, but trying to imagine how things would look to oneself, 
from the fi rst person perspective. I will opt for one theory of such enac-
tive imagining, namely the idea that we simulate perspective taking.4 
Here is then the preview.
Section 2.1 summarizes the main idea of the SC tradition, also 
mentioning a simple forerunner of SC idea, namely the Golden Rule 
proposal. It proposes a division of SC theories, contrasting fi rst the hy-
pothetical ones, and the non-hypothetical (or partly non-hypothetical 
ones), and then, within the fi rst group, those that rely on the picture 
of real, “normal” contractors, and those that propose idealization or 
other kinds of “retouch” of the parties participating. The SC PTE is 
built around the question for the would-be participants: what kind of 
arrangement would you accept, fi nd just and liveable? The subject is 
supposed to arrive at an intuitional answer to the question.
Section 2.2 is the central part of the paper, dedicated to account-
ing for PTEs, in particular for the epistemic-psychological side and the 
question of how the relevant intuition gets formed. The fi rst, very brief, 
subsection concerns the structure of a TE, and the second one turns to 
the role of simulation, that will be presented as the royal road to intu-
ition. After a general brief mention of theories of simulation, it turns 
to its role in practical TEs. This is the central sub-section and the most 
important part of the paper, stressing the central role of simulation 
and showing how it fi ts well with independently established require-
ments of contractualist PTEs.
Section 2.3 mentions some diffi culties with simulation that have 
been pointed to in the literature and offers some optimistic answer to 
them. In Conclusion we briefl y sketch the bigger picture, namely our 
3 I started defending this approach quarter a century ago, or, to put it more 
accurately a variant of it, in Miščević (1992).
4 Of course, some kind of fi rst person imagining might have been required in the 
Republic scenario: how would you feel if you had to lead the polis, and so on, but it is 
not central, as it will become in the SC tradition.
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proposal for accounting for cognitive mechanism underlying PTEs in 
general, hoping that it might help understanding thought-experiment-
ing in general and thus throw an additional light upon the foundations 
of methodology of philosophy.
Let me in the rest of this section introduce the kind of PTEs we 
shall be dealing with, namely the works in Social contract (SC) tradi-
tion that invite the reader to imagine social-political situations and 
arrangements that can come from the willingness of parties to come 
together and negotiate the best possibility. The fi rst modern authors, 
Hobbes and Locke, are not completely clear about the factual status of 
the Contract, whether it is a historical event or merely imagined one; 
with Rousseau and most explicitly Kant, it becomes “hypothetical” con-
tract, fi t to be classifi ed as a TE. At least since Rousseau it is discussed 
primarily from the fi rst-person perspective; the typical leading ques-
tion is Would you sign a contract ...under such-and-such conditions? 
We shall here set on one side contractarian version (due to authors 
like Hobbes and Gauthier (1986)) focused on maximization of the self-
interest of each participant, since it poses less challenging problems 
to participant’s imagination, and focus on the more challenging con-
tractualist line with authors like Rawls, Scanlon, Habermas and Parfi t 
(see References). The typical demand here is to put oneself in another’s 
shoes while asking yourself: what demands cannot be rejected by my 
interlocutor, if she is rational?
We can describe the crucial imaginative exercises as moral and po-
litical TEs from the fi rst-person perspective. This makes the SC tradi-
tion contrast with another famous tradition of thought-experimenting, 
starting at least with Plato’s Republic: building and understanding a 
complex social arrangement primarily from the third-person perspec-
tive (tell me, Glaucon, how would you judge the commonality of chil-
dren? is it just or not? and so on...). It continues by building a mega-
arrangement, and in more practically oriented cases ends as a utopia 
or dystopia, so to speak, with famous authors like Al Farabi, Thomas 
More and Fourrier. Let me mention a contemporary proposal from the 
third-person perspective, a simple and fi ne example: the camping trip 
and equality among campers in G. A. Cohen Why Not Socialism. On 
camping people exercise solidarity, treat each other as equal, help al-
truistically and without reservations, so, Cohen concludes, we can use 
it as a model for a socialist society Cohen uses the understanding of 
equality provided by the trip-model to argue for extremely high level of 
equality in his socialistic society. (Some cases that are diffi cult to clas-
sify, say, prominently Dworkin’s anti-luck TEs).
Back to contractualism. Let me quickly propose a systematization of 
the main philosophical proposals within the hypothetical contract views 
since they are most relevant for discussion of thought-experimental 
methodologies, all this with apologies for brevity. One line does not pro-
pose, at least explicitly, any retouch of ordinary circumstances: the par-
ticipants are real people, endowed just with ordinary rationality. Kant 
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and Parfi t (in On What Matters) are prime examples of such approach.
With Rawls, a different line of experimenting started. The real sub-
jects are replaced or supplemented by somewhat “retouched” model 
participants; in Rawls’ work the “parties” in the Original position, are 
famously placed behind the Veil-of-ignorance, and they just “represent” 
the real persons who make their contract on the basis of principles fi g-
ured out by the “parties”.5 In the Original position the person decides 
to try the Veil-of-ignorance; she attempts to answer the crucial ques-
tion: what arrangement would you choose if you were ignorant of some 
important aspects of your future situation? You ask yourself: shall I be 
male? Or female? And what is the best decision to take if I don’t know 
the answer? Shall I be intelligent? Or stupid? And so on.
Her counterpart, the “party” behind the Veil has to do the job:
The idea here is simply to make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that 
it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for principles of justice, and 
therefore on these principles themselves. Thus it seems reasonable and gen-
erally acceptable that no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by 
natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles. It also 
seems widely agreed that it should be impossible to tailor principles to the 
circumstances of one’s own case. We should insure further that particular 
inclinations and aspirations, and persons’ conceptions of their good do not 
affect the principles adopted. (Rawls 1999: 16)
The typical questions concern wealth, status, talents and the like. How 
would you decide if you knew you will be poor? Or, deprived of interest-
ing and important talents? The person’s identity is preserved, and she 
simulates her reaction in a different situation than her actual one. The 
reason why in the Original position she has to deprive the participants 
of concrete knowledge of their actual standing in various relations in 
society is that participants have working models of social interaction. 
Therefore, if the person is choosing rationally, she will be partial to his 
(actual and future) self, and the promise of justice will be gone. Now, 
behind the Veil the participant does not know how rich she will be. She 
has to imagine herself being very rich (vow!), being moderately well off 
(not bad!) and being very poor (God forbid!).
Since parties have rich general information, she uses her default 
knowledge of how it feels being rich, well off and poor. She does not 
proceed to building a further model from the third-person perspective, 
but reasoning from the fi rst-person perspective: let me imagine myself 
being poor, etc.! It is here that we shall introduce the idea of simula-
tion. And the imagining will result in producing an answer, a particu-
5 Rawls in his The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, The Tanner Lectures on 
Human Values April 10, 1981 stresses the following advice: “Two different parts 
of the original position must be carefully distinguished. These parts correspond to 
the two powers of moral personality, or to what I have called the capacity to be 
reasonable and the capacity to be rational. While the original position as a whole 
represents both moral powers, and therefore represents the full conception of the 
person, the parties as rationally autonomous representatives of persons in society 
represent only the Rational (...).” In McMurrin (1986: 19).
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lar intuition: I should secure myself against the risks of ending up in a 
very bad situation.
Let me just mention the other famous retouch options. The main 
alternative to ignorance is idealization: how would my interlocutor re-
act if she were made a bit more rational, and the discussion and deci-
sion situation were closer to an ideal one? Again, we are invited to put 
ourselves in another’s shoes, this time in the shoes of a richly rational 
person, in the sense of rationality that also includes moral sensibility 
(in contrast to the means-end rationality of parties behind Rawls’ Veil. 
What demands cannot be rejected by my interlocutor, if she is rational, 
Thomas Scanlon is asking:
My view ... holds that thinking about right and wrong is, at the most basic 
level, thinking about what could be justifi ed to others on grounds that they, 
if appropriately motivated, could not reasonably reject. On this view the 
idea of justifi ability to others is taken to be basic in two ways. First, it is by 
thinking about what could be justifi ed to others on grounds that they could 
not reasonably reject that we determine the shape of more specifi c moral 
notions such as murder or betrayal. Second, the idea that we have reason to 
avoid actions that could not be justifi ed in this way accounts for the distinc-
tive normative force of moral wrongness. (Scanlon 1998 :5)
The procedure is presented as valid for political, institutional arrange-
ments as well as for individual morality. Scanlon talks about “stan-
dards that institutions must meet if they are to be justifi able to those 
to whom they claim to apply” (Scanlon 2016: 5). So, suppose I want to 
propose a practice or institution P that is to apply to you. I have to get 
into your shoes: what kind of arguments would rationally persuade you 
to accept P? And a particular intuitional answer follows.
Finally, let me mention Habermas, who explicitly talks about his 
proposal as a TE (1989), and proposes to introduce idealized communi-
cative situation as a whole, not just idealizations concerning the par-
ticipants. Here is a brief characterization from the chapter “Remarks 
on Discourse Ethics”:
The notion that ideal role taking-that is, checking and reciprocally reversing 
interpretive perspectives under the general communicative presuppositions 
of the practice of argumentation-becomes both possible and necessary loses 
its strangeness when we refl ect that the principle of universalization merely 
makes explicit what it means for a norm to be able to claim validity. Already 
in Kant the moral principle is designed to explicate the meaning of the valid-
ity of norms; it expresses, with specifi c reference to normative propositions, 
the general intuition that true or correct statements are not valid just for 
you or me alone. Valid statements must admit of justifi cation by appeal to 
reasons that could convince anyone irrespective of time or place. In raising 
claims to validity, speakers and hearers transcend the provincial standards 
of a merely particular community of interpreters and their spatiotemporally 
localized communicative practice. (Habermas 1994: 52).
We are invited to see idealizations as those simultaneously unavoid-
able and trivial accomplishments that sustain communicative action 
and argumentation (Habremas 1994: 55). Commonsensical moves, like 
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attributing identical meanings to expressions, attaching “context-tran-
scending signifi cance to validity claims”, and ascription of rationality 
and accountability to speakers are pragmatic presupposition of com-
munication that involve some idealization. The philosophical idealiza-
tions just continue where the ordinary ones stop.
In short, we thus have “retouched” (distorted) model participants 
and situations, changed basically in two directions. First, ignorance: 
what arrangement would you choose if you were ignorant of some im-
portant aspects of your future situation? Second, idealization what de-
mands cannot be rejected by my interlocutor, if she is rational? And 
if we are placed in an ideal communicative situation? And here is the 
scheme of the division:
Of course, the proponents of the ignorance strategy, Rawls and his 
many followers, have been confronting the defenders of idealization, 
like Habermas and Scanlon with their followers, and vice versa, and 
the debate has reached epic proportions. However, we have to leave it 
for another occasion, and pass to our main topic, the mechanism that 
produces the answers-intuitions.
2. Accounting for PTEs: The Role of Simulation
2.1 The task ahead
How do people understand imaginative scenarios essential for PTEs? 
Not much has been written about mechanism underlying PTEs. We 
need a more detailed look at TEs in general, and PTEs in particular.
Take fi rst the simplest example, the Golden rule. Suppose I am brag-
ging around with my knowledge of some area, and letting my colleague 
know how ignorant and incapable they are, when it comes to important 
issues. My wife asks: “Well, how would you feel if somebody were do-
ing this to you?” I am supposed to imagine the reversed situation, go 
through the process of being humiliated, and feel what people normally 
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feel in such situations. This should make me sensitive to what I am do-
ing. Here is Parfi t’s description of the typical process:
When we apply the Golden Rule, our thought-experiment is fairly simple. 
As when making many ordinary decisions, we ask what would happen in 
the actual world if we acted, on one occasion, in each of certain possible 
ways.
We don’t even need to decide what are the morally relevant descriptions of 
these particular possible acts. But we try to think about these possibilities, 
not only from our own point of view, but also from the points of view of all of 
the other people whom our act might affect. We ask what we would rational-
ly be willing to do, and have done to us, if we were going to be in all of these 
people’s positions, and would be relevantly like them. (Parfi t 2011: 328)
Let me propose a picture of the process of reasoning in a TE. We have 
two persons, the experimenter and the subject. At the preliminary 
stage, call it stage 0, the experimenter formulation her design: in our 
example, show to me that I should not humiliate my colleagues, and 
she wants to do this by asking me to imagine switching the role with a 
colleague, call him Jack.
At stage one, comes the presentation of the scenario thus construct-
ed to the experimental subject, in this example to me: imagine you are 
Jack, the person that you have been humiliating!
At stage two, I, the experimental subject, come to understand the 
question. For instance, how would you feel if somebody were doing this 
to you? 
At stage three comes the tentative production, “modeling” of the sce-
nario at the conscious level. I imagine being humiliated. Then some 
unconscious processing might get in. The stage concerns the production 
of the answer, involving the generation of intuition; for instance, how I 
would feel in the shoes of the victim. This probably involves reasoning 
at the unconscious level; for instance, I might have to control my ar-
rogance, and belief that yes, my colleagues are not as good as I am, and 
the like. This might result in an immediate, unconscious intuition, e.g. 
Yes, I would feel terribly...
At the next, fourth stage, the thinker comes out with explicit intu-
ition at the conscious level, usually geared to the particular example 
and having little generality (again, I would feel terribly, etc.). This ends 
the core TE
Usually however, there is a fi fth stage. The thinker often has to do 
some varying and generalizing, at the conscious and reflective level 
and, perhaps, at the unconscious one too. For instance, in the story I 
might be unimpressed by threat concerning my professional abilities. 
Imagine then, my wife might say, your young colleagues making dep-
recatory remarks about your age, suggesting it’s time for you to retire, 
and let more energetic, younger people occupy the stage. And imagine 
that this is done by a younger colleague, what if it is done by a brilliant 
doctorate student, of someone else, over whom I have no power? Some-
times this process of going through related micro-TEs is called intui-
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tive induction (Chisholm 1966). I end up with a general belief that my 
behavior is morally not acceptable. No matter what, such kind of treat-
ment is awful, I would feel this for sure if someone did treat me thus.
If I am refl ective enough, I might go one step further, to stage six. I 
first, consciously perform the aggregation of micro-TEs; second, I try to 
harmonize the result s of these micro-TEs with each other, and finally, I 
arrive at a judgment of their coherence with other moral intuitions one 
might. In other words, this philosophical unification can be described 
in terms of reflective equilibrium, fi rst narrow and then wide. Here, the 
general knowledge of more empirical kind is brought into play. I ar-
rive at important and diffi cult task of comparing the result with all we 
know about life and politics, both personal experiential level and from 
history, social and natural sciences, reaching a wide refl ective equilib-
rium as the fi nal result.
A similar, but more demanding process goes on in the case of a 
contractualist TE. Take the Veil-of-ignorance situation and assume 
you are a male. Now you are asked to ponder the following Rawlsian 
question: what distributive arrangement would I chose if I didn’t know 
whether I will be rich or poor? I basically go through same or analogous 
stages, and reach the fi nal (non-moral) intuition, say I don’t want to 
risk extreme forms of poverty, I want a decent life even if I am not rich. 
(Habermas similarly talks about “interlocking of perspectives”, where 
everyone is required to take the perspective of “everyone else (1995: 
117)).
Here, we shall be mostly interested in stages three and four where 
this is supposed to occur. How does the thinker model the situation 
proposed in the scenario, and how is the resulting intuition produced? 
For this, we turn to cognitive investigations.
2.2. Simulation, the royal road to intuition 
We have implicitly pointed to a promising answer: the thinker arrives 
to her intuition through mental modelling. I have been defending the 
role of mental modelling for more than two and a half decades (see 
Miščević 1992). David Davies mentions that I set “out clearly (1992: 24) 
how this approach solves the usual puzzles about TEs” (2018: 520). TEs 
enable us to produce new data by manipulating old data through the 
generation of a manipulable representation of a problem. In construct-
ing and manipulating this model, we mobilize prior cognitive resources 
in new ways.
I would go further and claim that what cognitive science tells us 
about perspective taking, and more particularly about simulation, of-
fers an interesting variety of this answer to our question. The idea that 
simulation produces the relevant intuition suggests the role of com-
petences in TEs. I have been conjecturing that some of them might be 
quite general (the capacity to simulate other person’s mental states 
which will occupy us in the sequel), some less general (folk-physics), 
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and some completely specialized (spatial, linguistic and mathematical 
skills). This suggests that the typical verdicts from TEs are in a way 
voice of competence, albeit a discreet one, often mixed with those from 
other sources (general intelligence, social skills, emotional life) (see 
Miščević 2006, 2012). Here I want to introduce some new proposals, 
focusing on our capacity for perspective taking.
Let me distinguish two kinds of mental modelling that often get 
confused in the literature. One is the third-person model-building, for 
instance imagining a planet when reading a science-fi ction story or Put-
nam’s Twin earth description. The planet is an object that is imagined 
from a third-person perspective, relatively static, although allowing 
for some imagined movement. The other is the kind that will interest 
us here: the fi rst-person process of modelling, typically through mental 
simulation, in which the subject imagines herself as the protagonist. 
Let me fi rst say a few words about the third-person model-building. 
Mental models, psychologists tell us, purport to represent concrete 
situations, with determinate objects and relations (precisely what is 
demanded in thought experiments) (Johnson-Laird 1983: 157). Their 
structure is not arbitrary, but “plays a direct representational role 
since it is analogous to the corresponding state of affairs in the world” 
(Johnson-Laird 1983: 157). One can distinguish simple static “frames” 
representing relations between a set of objects, crucially of human 
beings in the PTEs, temporal models consisting of sequences of such 
frames, kinematic models which is the temporal model with continu-
ous time, and fi nally dynamic models which model causal relations. 
Reasoning in mental models demands rules for manipulation. Johnson-
Laird hypothesizes the existence of general procedures which add new 
elements to the model, and ‘a procedure that integrates two or more 
hitherto separated models if an assertion interrelates entities in them’. 
The integration of models is subject to consistency requirements—if 
the joint model is logically impossible, some change has to be made 
(Miščević 1992: 220).6
Can this model-building from the third-person perspective help us 
with examples like Golden Rule and Veil-of-ignorance? Doesn’t look very 
promising. The sinner in the Golden Rule experimenting is not supposed 
to imagine a neutral, distanced situation; she has to imagine herself in 
the reversed situation. Similarly, the thinker behind the Veil asks her-
self how she herself would choose, from the fi rst-person perspective.
Here, a plausible alternative mechanism that would enable model-
ling from the fi rst-person perspective is a mechanism of perspective 
taking. Psychologists talk about various ways of simulating and have 
interesting things to say about this. Consider the famous psychologists 
C. Daniel Batson. In his (2009) paper he writes:
Encounter a stranger in need and, sometimes, you will feel empathic con-
6 Other authors in the similar vein are Zwaan and Radvansky (1998), Hohwy 
(2013), and Frith (2007).
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cern—an other-oriented emotional response evoked by and congruent with 
the perceived welfare of that person. What determines whether you will? 
Perhaps the most common answer among psychologists is that empathic 
concern is felt when you adopt the perspective of the person in need (…). But 
in this answer, what is meant by adopting the person’s perspective? First, it 
is an act of imagination. One does not literally take another person’s place 
or look through his or her eyes. One imagines how things look from the 
other’s point of view. Second, it is not the same as perspective taking in the 
symbolic-interaction tradition (…). In that tradition, one adopts the per-
spective of another—often a signifi cant other—to imaginatively see oneself 
through the other’s eyes (and values). The perspective taking that evokes 
empathic concern involves imaginatively perceiving the other’s situation, 
not oneself. (Batson 2009: 267)
Philosophers and psychologists talk a lot about empathy, as a paradig-
matic kind of perspective taking. However, there are several termino-
logical problem connected with the term “empathy”; fi rst, often carries 
connotations of “sympathy”, so that empathetic understanding is the 
one that is accompanied by sympathetic feelings.7 Famous authors rou-
tinely connect the two (de Waal 2009, Clohesy 2013).8
Since we fi nd mental Simulation Theory the best account of per-
spective taking, we shall turn to it and talk about “mental simulation” 
as the relevant activity. We hope, however, that what we have to say 
holds for perspective taking in general, and, if Simulation Theory turns 
out to be defective, can be connected to whatever account of perspective 
taking replaces it. We shall thus speak of perspective taking, and in 
particular of mental simulation as the second kind of modelling, be-
sides the third-person one, that we need in order to answer the ques-
tion of how we arrive at our responses and other people’s ones in cases 
like Golden Rule or the Veil. Indeed, some authors relying on cognitive 
science count ability to simulate as a part of general modelling abil-
ity. Thomas Metzinger mentions important traits of mental models, 
like being multimodal, mutually embeddable, often analog rather than 
digital, and then adds ability to simulate (independently from input) 
(2003: 109ff.)
So, let us turn to simulation. We are mental simulators, not in the 
sense that we merely simulate mentation, but in the sense that we un-
derstand others by using our own mentation in a process of simulation, 
7 For relevant warnings see Amy Coplan (2011: 3). We shall heed the warnings 
and avoid unqualifi ed use of the term.
8 Here is a statement by psychologist Chris Frith: “One obvious question is why 
have we put together empathy and fairness? In neuroscience there is not much 
overlap in the literature on these topics. Fairness tends to be studied within the 
realm of neuroeconomics, whereas empathy springs from the burgeoning studies 
that followed the discovery of mirror neurons. However, the two concepts are linked 
when we think of a possible basis for morality. We don’t like to be treated unfairly 
ourselves and we empathise with others who are treated unfairly. We will act to 
correct unfairness and to prevent it recurring” (Firth 2007: 1).
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wrote Martin Davies (1994), and many colleagues, philosophers and 
cognitive scientists agree.9
We fi rst have to clear a terminological mess. Some psychologists use 
the term “simulation” for any kind of imaginative enacting, so it ends 
up as meaning: model-building and model-activating:
The model can depict the system at some point of abstraction (...) A simula-
tion is an applied methodology that can describe the behavior of that system 
using either a mathematical or a symbolic model (Sokolowski and Banks 
2009: 5)
We shall use “simulation” in a narrower sense: the modelling through 
simulation does not primarily result in an object-depiction, but is pri-
marily a fi rst-person guided process, from which the subject can learn 
relevant fi rst-person counterfactual matters (e.g. what would I do if I 
had to determine the price of my used car). Simulation thus involves 
the imagining subject (or his/her counterpart) as a part of scenario 
imagined. Remember: we understand others by using our own men-
tation in a process of simulation (Martin Davies). I shall be relying 
on a work already mentioned in the Introduction that is a synthesis 
of psychological and philosophical research on simulation (Goldman 
2006). Goldman points out the existence of an alternative view of psy-
chological understanding, namely Theory-Theory that postulates the 
existence of a cognitive module containing assumptions about “other 
minds” and ways they work.10 He allows for combination of the two (ST 
stands for “Simulation Theory”):
I shall call the act of assigning a state of one’s own to someone else projec-
tion. As we have just seen, projection is a standard part of the ST story 
of mindreading. It is the fi nal stage of each mindreading act, a stage that 
involves no (further) simulation or pretense. Indeed, it typically involves an 
“exit” from the simulation mode that occupies the fi rst stage of a two-stage 
routine. The simulation stage is followed by a projection stage. Thus, a more 
complete label for the so-called simulation routine might be “simulation-
plus-projection”. (Goldman 2006: 40)
Similarly, Perner stresses simulation but allows for Theory-Theory 
episodes Perner and Kühberger (2005). I would also advocate a hybrid: 
a blend of Simulation Theory and Theory-Theory, with emphasis on 
simulation. I shall also borrow a term from Goldman, “enactive imagin-
ing”. He notes the following: “When I imagine feeling elated, I do not 
merely suppose that I am elated; rather, I enact, or try to enact, elation 
itself. Thus, we might call this type of imagination ‘enactment imagina-
tion’” (Goldman 2006: 47). He distinguishes more primitive type of sim-
ulation, mainly unconscious and related to mirror neurons, and more 
sophisticated, higher kind exemplifi ed by enactive imagining, that is 
9 See, for example Currie (2002) and the now classical text Gordon (1986). 
For early debate between the two kinds of theories and for important original 
contributions to it see The mental simulation debate, in Peacocke (ed.) (1994: 104).
10 For early debate between the two kinds of theories and for important original 
contributions to it see The mental simulation debate in Peacocke (ed.) (1994: 104).
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relevant to us here. The latter is characterized by its target, namely 
“mental states of a relatively complex nature, such as “propositional 
attitudes”, by being partly “subject to voluntary control” and being to a 
high degree accessible to consciousness (Goldman 2006: 147). He pro-
poses a nice fl ow chart to illustrate the simulation. Let me illustrate it 
with the famous Fat Man TE. I am supposed to decide whether I would 
push the Fat Man from the bridge in order to save fi ve other people. 
Call me T I simulate my doing so; the fi nal stage of the process looks 
somewhat like the following.:
desire
belief decision mechanism decision belief
Let g stand for “I don’t want to feel guilty”, m for “I am not pushing the 
Fat Man”. Then (m→g) says that if I don’t push the Fat Man, I shall 
not feel guilty. The decision is not to push, and the belief is my belief 
about myself, namely that I will not do it.
We shall use the fl ow chart in the sequel for most important PTEs 
to be discussed.
A distinction often drawn in the context of Simulation Theory is the 
one drawn by Robert Gordon in his (1995) and discussed by Gregory 
Currie in his (2002: 56ff). It concerns the contrast between two projects; 
in the fi rst I “imagine is myself in your situation”, in the second I imag-
ine being you in that situation. A philosopher is immediately reminded 
of a puzzle famously raised by Bernard Williams in his paper “Imagina-
tion and the Self” (1976):
It seems unproblematic for me to imagine that I am Napoleon; asked to do 
this, I know roughly how to comply. (Contrast this with the instruction to 
imagine that someone else—Abraham Lincoln, say—is Napoleon; here it is 
much less clear how to proceed.) But if imagining is a guide to possibility, 
my imagining may lead me to a further, more metaphysical thought: the 
thought that I could have been Napoleon. And it is this that Williams fi nds 
puzzling: “I do not understand, and could not possibly understand, what it 
would be for me to have been Napoleon” (Williams 1976: 45).
Indeed, how could I (or Williams or anyone other than Napoleon) have 
been Napoleon? Surely only Napoleon could have been Napoleon. The 
answer would demand a paper of its own.11
11 But see Vendler (1984) and Ninan (2016) for relevant discussion.
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Can we trust Simulation Theory? How certain is it that people use 
simulation to understand each other? Here is a cautious formulation 
in a recent overview, “Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation”, offered 
by Gordon himself, together with his collaborator Luca Barlassina, in 
Stanford encyclopedia:
In particular, while the consensus view is now that both mental simulation 
and theorizing play important role in mindreading, the currently available 
evidence falls short of establishing what their respective roles are. In other 
words, it is likely that we shall end up adopting a hybrid model of mindread-
ing that combines ST and TT, but, at the present stage, it is very diffi cult 
to predict what this hybrid model will look like. Hopefully, the joint work of 
philosophers and cognitive scientists will help to settle the matter. (Gordon 
and Barlassina 2017, ST stands for Simulation-theory, and TT for Theory-
Theory)
The consensus “that both mental simulation and theorizing play im-
portant role in mindreading” is enough for our purposes. We shall thus 
assume that the Simulation Theory is the correct theory about a way, 
possible the most important way, in which a human being comes to fi nd 
out and understand the thoughts of her conspecifi cs. (This allows for 
other ways, like the ones proposed by Theory-Theory or special module 
theory.) So, we shall assume that our thought-experimenter simulates 
the possible states, including feelings of oneself and others, and derives 
her judgments from the simulation. (The presence of additional, say 
Theory-of-mind elements would not change the basic situation, as long 
as simulation does play and important role). However, I hope that most 
of conclusions of this paper are valid for perspective-taking and imagi-
native enacting in general, independently of a particular mechanism 
in charge of it.
2.3. Simulation in TEs, moral, political and legal
It is now time to bring together the issues of perspective taking and our 
main topic, moral, political and legal TEs. Some TEs obviously involve 
empathetic perspective taking that ends in sympathy with the charac-
ters involved. The Trolley and Fat man TEs are a clear example, where 
the experimental results show a direct and strong involvement of sub-
jects who have to imagine, presumably enactively to push by their own 
hands the Fat man, and kill him in this way. We normally have no 
problem in simulating to some degree the pain of other. Here is what 
neuroscientists tell us.
Seeing or imagining others in pain may activate both the sensory and affec-
tive components of the neural network (pain matrix) that is activated dur-
ing the personal experience of pain. (Minio-Paluello, Avenanti, and Aglioti 
2006: 320).
So, why people fi nd pushing the Fat man way more problematic than 
just turning the switch? Apparently different parts of brain get in-
volved. Simulation assumption might help a bit: when one simulates 
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turning the switch, the act itself looks neutral, apart from indirect con-
sequences. When one simulates pushing a person from a bridge, it feels 
like actually doing it. The neurologists (Roth et al. 1996) tell us that in 
people simulating movement the primary motor cortex gets involved, 
as if they were themselves doing the hand movements. If this holds, 
there is a qualitative difference in feeling when one is simulating turn-
ing the switch, a neutral indirect causing of change in trolley’s path, 
and when one is simulating the effortful pushing of a heavy object, 
the Fat man. If one feels imaginatively enacting the later as if it were 
one’s actual effort, it is clear why it feels like killing the man with one’s 
hands. Indeed, here simulation might explain the difference in feeling. 
(But more research has to be done before any defi nitive conclusion is 
taken.)12
The other pretty obvious kind of perspective taking are the Golden 
Rule cases. It is here that the very rich literature on empathy, often 
connected with sympathy, and sometimes distinguished, becomes rel-
evant.13 And simulation normally generates empathy and sympathy 
(see Copman and Goldie 2011).14
Here, the issue of moral evaluation intervenes. Let me quote the 
philosopher who connects morality and empathetic simulation very di-
rectly and radically. It is Mark Johnson.
Moral imagination is our fundamental capacity to imagine how certain val-
ues and commitments are likely to play out in future experience, without 
actually performing those actions and having to deal with their lived con-
sequences. The quality of our moral thinking therefore depends on (1) the 
depth and breadth of one’s knowledge of the physical and social worlds he 
or she inhabits, (2) one’s understanding of human motivation and cognitive/
affective development, (3) one’s perceptiveness of which factors are most 
relevant in a particular situation, and (4) one’s ability to simulate the ex-
periences and responses of other people with whom you are interacting. It 
is thus as much an affair of imagination as it is an appropriation of prior 
knowledge. (Johnson 2016: 363)
Passing to moral imagination Johnson characterizes it simply as simu-
lation. It gives us “a deep sense of how others might experience a situ-
ation” and he connects it with empathy and talks about “empathetic 
imagination,” which, in his view, makes it possible for us to appreciate 
and take up the part of others.
Let us now pass to social contract PTEs which make up one of the 
two most prominent kinds and traditions of macro-PTEs. (With apolo-
gies for very little space dedicated to each famous PTE in the tradition; 
12 The reader might like to consult the chapters on imagination and morals 
by Thomas Schramme, Antti Kauppinen, Alison E. Denham, David Shoemaker, 
Ishtiyaque Haji and Maurice Hamington in Maibom (2017). 
13 On Golden Rule and empathy see Neusner and Chilton (2008), Pfaff (2007) and 
Wattles (1996: 144ff.).
14 Goldman has anticipated it in his (1992) again reprinted in Goldman (2013: 
174–197).
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I am looking for a general pattern). They are ideal for bringing simu-
lation and political thought-experimenting together. Here, in contrast 
to Plato’s tradition of building of the ideal state from the third person 
perspective, the interlocutor is asked to consider the possibility of liv-
ing in some given arrangement and she is expected to imagine herself 
actually doing it. Here is a fi ne, relatively recent statement connecting 
the tradition to perspective taking:
Contract theorists hold that to judge whether an action or institutional ar-
rangement is morally justifi ed, one must determine whether it is in con-
formity with principles that would be the object of agreement. They thus 
assume that persons are able to discern the content of this hypothetical 
agreement. They thereby assume, I will argue, that persons are able to de-
termine the acceptability of principles from other perspectives than their 
own present point of view. This is one out of two assumptions on which 
my investigation regarding the empirical plausibility of contract theory will 
concentrate. (Timmerman 2014: 2)
Now, behind the Veil the participant does not know how rich s/he will 
be. S/He has to imagine him/herself being very rich (vow!), being mod-
erately well off (not bad!) and being very poor (God forbid!). According 
to my general proposal, s/he uses his/her default knowledge of being 
rich, well off and poor. How does the knowledge then get used? Not 
inbuilding a further model from the third-person perspective, but in 
simulating: let me imagine myself being poor, etc.! Let me remind you 
of Rawls’ formulation from his Theory of Justice:
The aim is to rule out those principles that it would be rational to propose 
for acceptance, however little the chance of success, only if one knew certain 
things that are irrelevant from the standpoint of justice. For example, if a 
man knew that he was wealthy, he might fi nd it rational to advance the 
principle that various taxes for welfare measures be counted unjust; if he 
knew that he was poor, he would most likely propose the contrary principle. 
To represent the desired restrictions one imagines a situation in which ev-
eryone is deprived of this sort of information. One excludes the knowledge 
of those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided 
by their prejudices. In this manner the veil of ignorance is arrived at in a 
natural way. (Rawls 1999: 16)
As we mentioned, we shall concentrate on stages two to six, stressing 
the third stage. At stage one, the question is understood by you: you 
realize that you have to decide on purely rational grounds, in your own 
best interest. At stage two you start consciously building the model of 
the scenario suggested. You might be tempted to take a risk: why not 
special privileges for the rich ones, at the expense of the poor ones. But 
then you imagine yourself being poor, and people you know suddenly 
being very privileged rich ones. Here the simulation might set in.
The third stage, we propose, concerns the production of the answer, 
involving the generation of intuition as to whether the arrangement is 
acceptable to you. This probably involves decision making at the un-
conscious level. Your cognitive apparatus might revive some memories 
of poor people that you have suppressed from your consciousness, and 
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they might at the end motivate you not to risk. Richer simulation helps. 
You then come fi rst with an immediate, unconscious intuition (I don’t 
want to risk, I want an I arrangement that will be generous to the 
poor), at the stage four; other consideration intervene, and at the fifth 
stage, you come out with explicit intuition at the conscious level: I don’t 
want to risk extreme forms of poverty, I want a decent life even if I am 
not rich.
Let us return to Goldman’s schema. Call me T. Remember, I have a 
belief box (of oval shape), with the relevant belief: if I reject the privi-
leges for the rich (m), I might end up having a decent life (g), even if I 
am relatively low on the social scale. I also have a desire box, square 
shaped in the drawing. The desire to have a decent life is sitting there. 
My simulating apparatus, of hexagonal form, puts together the two 
contents, m→g and g. But how can I, the imagined or simulated T, get 
to g? Well, by m—rejecting the privileges for the rich.
So, T will decide to reject privileges for the rich. Rawls is vindicated.
But wait, I have assumed I shall be a well-surviving gentleman? 
But what if I turn out to be a female? And turn out to love children? I 
want more chances for myself and for them. This sixth stage of varying 
and generalizing, the intuitive induction, might make you even more 
egalitarian: I want children of relatively poor couple to have equal op-
portunities as children of relatively rich ones
What does cognitive study of simulation tell us about these process-
es and capacities involved? As we noted, there are two different ways 
of perceiving the other’s situation, and these are often confused. First, 
you can imagine how another person sees his or her situation and feels 
as a result (an imagine-other perspective). Second, you can imagine how 
you would see the situation were you in the other person’s position and 
how you would feel as a result (an imagine-self perspective).
Goldman notes that “egocentric” mindreading tendencies are found 
in both children and adults. Goldie described the imagine other per-
spective as “imagining the enactment of a narrative from that other 
person’s point of view” (1999: 397). The result is not simply understand-
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ing, but sensitive understanding. It is this form of perspective taking 
that has been claimed to evoke other-oriented empathic concern (Bat-
son 1987, 1991). This imagine-self perspective connects self-recognition 
to other recognition (see Pfaff 2007: 65ff). A developed account of this 
kind appeals specifi cally to mental simulation or something suffi ciently 
like it. (see Pfaff 2007: 69ff.). C. Daniel Batson, a famous author in cog-
nitive study of perspective taking writes:
An imagine-self perspective involves, in Adam Smith’s colorful phrase, 
“changing places in fancy.” It has also been called “mental simulation” 
(Goldman 1992; Gordon 1992). Especially when the other’s situation is un-
familiar or unclear, imagining how you would feel in that situation may 
provide a useful, possibly essential, basis for sensitive understanding of the 
other’s plight. It may provide a stepping-stone to imagining how the other is 
affected by his or her situation and so to empathic concern. But if the other 
differs from you, then although focusing on how you would think and feel 
in the other’s situation may provide comparative context, it also may prove 
misleading (…). (Batson 2009: 268).
Back to Rawls: the easier task is for myself, a male with long life expe-
rience, to imagine myself being poor. It is the case of imagining myself, 
as I am in a different situation. The diffi cult task is to imaging myself 
being a relatively young women with with a strong attachment to my 
newborn child, who needs me 24 hours a day. Human beings can in 
principle do both Goldman’s sketch of simulation offers an elegant way 
to depict the process (he mentions the connection (2006: 294), unfortu-
nately without developing it).
In the situation we are discussing, I am cognitively to “quarantine” 
my beliefs and desires that are irrelevant (2006: 30). Let me apply it 
to the reasoning under the Veil. Change the meaning of g, h and the 
rest. Suppose that g stands for “I want good circumstances for my child 
to develop and live in”, and suppose that I am a relatively indifferent 
male. For me, then, ~g holds. I might also have a belief h that my abil-
ity to struggle and achieve good conditions for myself are way more im-
portant than social care for children. Then I will never arrive at doing 
m, say accepting a very high degree of egalitarianism.
Well, what I should do is to quarantine ~g, h, and my reserva-
tions about the m-g connection, ~(m→g) belief. Rejecting ~g 
makes me want good circumstances for my imagined child to develop 
and live in, rejecting h, helps me to avoid unreasonable self-confi dence. 
I realize that accepting a very high degree of egalitarianism (our m) 
would provide the right circumstances for my would-be child (m→g):
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I opt for m, and end up with the Rawlsian choice. All in all, I have to 
abstract from (‘quarantine’) my other interests and perhaps some rel-
evant (male-centered) beliefs. This brings us to a frequent objection to 
Rawls’s Original position:
… the parties are deprived of so much information that they are incapable 
of making any choice at all. How can we make any rational choice without 
knowledge of our fundamental values? To begin with, the parties do know 
of their need for the primary goods and their higher-order interests in the 
moral powers. (Freeman 2007: 160).
Translated into cognitive terminology, how much information, in par-
ticular information about myself, can I quarantine, and still compe-
tently decide about the right choice for me? Let me try a hunch of an 
answer to the question quoted. Supposed I am behind some science-fi c-
tional veil of ignorance, let us say abducted by aliens from an inhabit-
able exoplanet, say Kepler 62 f, and I know two things. First, there are 
different societies co-existing there, some more tolerant, some less, and 
second, the aliens might tamper with my brain, and change the values 
I shall wake up with after the tempering. What society should I choose? 
It seems obvious to me that I should opt for the most tolerant one. In 
the worst case, if I am to wake up with a lot of crazy ‘values’ ruling in 
my brain, I want now to be tolerated once this happens; the more toler-
ant the society, the better for me. The Minimax gives the right answer: 
choose the society which will offer most even in the worst case. A lot 
more should be said, but I believe that the quarantining interpretation 
offers a good fi rst step in direction of an answer.
Let me come to the end of my short list of illustration of famous TEs 
that seem to demand simulation in their implementation, with a brief, 
all too brief pointing to the work of Thomas Scanlon. One of his many 
examples is the right to privacy (1998: 204), but he does not give any 
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detailed recipe; so let me try to provide one. How would one argue for 
the right, discussing matters with a somewhat voyeuristic neighbor? 
The fi rst move is like the Golden Rule one: one can ask the neighbor to 
imagine that he is being peeped upon. Imagination will involve simula-
tion. If the neighbor sees the point, one can try to offer a more general 
proposal. Imagine other people, how would they feel if deprived of right 
of privacy? More simulation might be required. Here is Scanlon’s gen-
eral statement:
Some of the most common forms of moral bias involve failing to think of 
various points of view which we have not occupied, underestimating the 
reasons associated with them, and overestimating the costs to us of accept-
ing principles that recognize the force of those reasons. (Scanlon 1998: 206)
The simplest way to recognize the reasons associated with “points of 
view which we have not occupied” is by trying to simulate them. We 
“quarantine” our own point of view, and replace it with the target one, 
and then enter simulation n. (Habermas discusses “taking the attitude 
on the other” commenting G. H. Mead in the fundamentally important 
chapter on Mead and Durkheim of his The Theory of Communicative 
Action v. 2, from 1981. He then incorporates it into his own theory as its 
basic assumption; for a brief, principled statement see his (1995: 117)).
Let me note that Scanlon’s most famous work on the topic has been 
done in the area of ethics; however, like other contractualists, he con-
nects it with political philosophy and talks about morality of institu-
tions (2016) along the same lines he proposed for individual morality. 
So, back to the stages of TE, armed with a sketch of Simulation The-
ory. We have located the perspective taking at the stage four, the one 
in which the scenario proposed is being worked out. At the next, fifth 
stage, thinker comes out with explicit intuition at the conscious level, 
usually geared to the particular example and having little generality.
In our example, the male thinker has imagined being a female, and 
has arrived to the decision that the best course for him would be to opt 
for gender equality in the future society.
Sixth stage: since the typical job in previous stage is consideration 
of some particular scenario, the thinker will next have to do some vary-
ing and generalizing (deploying both moral and rational competences) 
at the conscious and reflective level and, perhaps, at the unconscious 
one too. Sometimes this process is called intuitive induction (Chisholm 
1966). In our example, the thinker imagines himself as being poor, and 
then as being not very talented for well-payed jobs, and so on.
In the Veil-of-ignorance kind of TEs the experimenting yields a se-
ries of prudential answers-intuitions. What about the moral judgment? 
It is the result of more theoretical refl ection, after the descriptive infor-
mation gained by simulation has been systematized. (Rawls sometimes 
talks about a wider framework of entering social contract, with “strains 
of commitment” securing the moral side, but we cannot enter it now; for 
a fi ne analysis see Waldron’s “Strains of Commitment” in Hinton (2015)
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This kind of combined strategy is a must for the classical contractu-
alist tradition. In Kant (and Parfi t) you decide about the moral status 
of a maxim after you have calculated the consequences of its becoming 
the universal rule. In Scanlon, you decide about the moral status of 
your proposal after you have gone through imagining other people’s 
reactions to it, and your attempts at persuading them. In Rawls, you 
decide about the normative status of your proposal after you have test-
ed it under the Veil, possibly comparing it to other alternatives, and 
calculating which of them will assure the maximin result. Call the fi rst 
task the descriptive-factual exercise, and the second the normative der-
ivation. Note that Habermas and Scanlon build more normativity into 
the decision phase. Habermas, for example, derives it from the regula-
tive use of speech: “The social reality that we address in our regulative 
speech acts has by its very nature an intrinsic link to normative valid-
ity claims” (Habermas 1990: 61).
In simpler kinds of practical TEs, like the Fat Man and Golden 
Rule, the initial moral judgment is the direct result of empathy gener-
ated by simulation. It offers and account of how morality enters the 
picture, congenial to sentimentalists ethics.15
Let me conclude by mentioning an example from philosophy of 
law, the area that has not been much discussed until now in terms 
of thought-experimenting (but see in this issue the paper of Miomir 
Matulović, to whom I also owe the example that follows). Friedrich Carl 
von Savigny talks about the interpreter reconstructing the thought (Ge-
danke) “enclosed in a law”. Good interpreters should put themselves 
in the same starting point of the legislator, and “artifi cially repeat in 
themselves his way of proceeding, so that the law may come to be born 
again in their mind” (1867: 171). Here, we are explicitly asked to step 
into ancient legislator’s shoes, and pretend we are legislating in his 
place. This putting oneself in the place of the author (“Gleichsetzung 
mit dem Verfasser”, in the original German) seems to be a common 
strategy suggested in early nineteenth century German hermeneutics. 
Schleiermacher asks: “But how can we understand the inner process 
of the writer from this? By observation. But this is based on self-ob-
servation” (1998: 135; the original manuscript dates from 1828). And, 
he claims that “/.../ one must put oneself in the place of the author on 
the objective and the subjective side” (1998: 24); the “objective” here is 
“linguistic” and the “subjective” is the psychological.16
Here is then the overview of the areas where simulation plays a 
central role:
15 See for instance Slote (2007). The darker side of this connection, recently 
intensely discussed in connection with the Fat Man TE, is the possibility that 
empathetic gut reactions usurp the place of rational consideration. See for discussion 
and references Cushman, Young, and Greene (2010).
16 For parallels with Savigny’s contemporaries writing about understanding and 
empathy in general see the historical overview in the Introduction to Coplan and 
Goldie (2011). See also Girard (2017) and Leyh (1992).
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2.4. Should we be pessimistic about simulation? 
A quick glance at the literature
What about diffi culties connected with simulation? Let me briefl y men-
tion a few problems raised by some authors, then an optimistic counter-
proposal, and conclude with moderate optimism. The simple schemas 
we reproduced seem to suggest that quarantining and putting oneself 
in another’s shoes is an easy matter, but of course, neither Goldman 
nor cognitive psychologists think it is. Here is a characterization of 
some diffi culties.
Epley and Caruso (2009: 297ff) list three “critical barriers” as they 
call it: activating the ability to simulate, adjusting “an egocentric de-
fault” (in their parlance), and accessing information about others. For 
this, they have to do several things. First, they must actively think 
about another person’s mental state, thus activating the process of 
perspective taking. Second, they must abstract from their own char-
acteristics, which is normally not easy. Third, they must deploy non-
egocentric information about other people in a skilled manner. (Ibid.). 
None of this is particularly easy.
Some authors go much further in pointing to problems. Let me 
choose a recent warning due to Shannon Spaulding. In her paper on 
“Simulation Theory” (2016a), and even more in “Imagination Through 
Knowledge” (2016b) she comes up with interesting challenges brings 
further challenges. But before doing this, she offers clarifi catory and 
classifi catory information that is extremely useful, given that the term 
“simulation” is used in many senses, and there is clear need to distin-
guish them to avoid very bad confusions; let me summarize the infor-
mation quickly. Spaulding starts from Goldman’s proposal according 
to which a process P simulates process P’ if and only if fi rst P dupli-
cates, replicates, or resembles P’ in some signifi cant respect and two, 
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in its duplication of P’, P fulfi lls one of its purposes or functions. In 
the case of mindreading simulation, the purpose or function of is to 
understand target’s mental states. She then introduces the crucial dis-
tinction between abstract and concrete simulation, the fi rst including 
activities like computer simulation and the like, and the second being 
the psychological simulation that involves “sameness of system and 
fi ne-grained process” (2016a: 264). The distinction is very helpful, and 
could save writers from confusions that mark the scene of present-day 
investigation of simulation.
Spaulding next distinguishes high-level from low-level simulation. 
She lists three characteristics of the former. First, it “involves imagi-
nation in the conventional sense” (267) Second, it explains our engage-
ment with fi ction, where we put ourselves “in the fi ctional character’s 
position and imagine what we would think, feel, and do in that situ-
ation. Third, it explains how one can get knowledge through simula-
tional imagination, so that if could be “co-opted to explain how some 
thought experiments work” (267). In contrast, in low level simulation, 
“imagination operates unconsciously and automatically.”
Now, on the skeptical side, Spaulding’s most direct challenge to the 
project of fi nding constraints that would rehabilitate imagination is to 
be found her, “Imagination Through Knowledge” (2016b). On her view, 
the puzzle of how we arrive to knowledge through imagination sug-
gests that imagination is “not suffi cient for new knowledge” (2016b: 
222). The argument seems to be the following: if imagination is to be 
constrained by extra-imaginative pieces of information and by other 
abilities, then imagination does not bring new knowledge. But this is 
too severe a demand. Compare physical constraints. I commute from 
my home town to my working place about hundred miles distance. For 
the car to bring me to my work there should be a well-established and 
well-kept road, constraining the travel, there should be red lights help-
ing to prevent crashes, and so on. Imagine someone arguing that there-
fore “car is not suffi cient” for commuting, and is not doing any real 
work! Well, the fact that an item needs constraints to function properly 
does not entail that it never performs any function.
Spaulding has an auxiliary argument: “I have argued that the cogni-
tive capacity to imagine scenarios is distinct from the cognitive capaci-
ties that underlie our ability to judge the accuracy of our imaginings” 
(2016b: 222) and “/…/there is nothing in the capacity of imagination 
itself that could evaluate the accuracy of the possibilities we imagine.” 
(2016b: 222). Indeed, there is nothing in the car itself that recognizes 
red/green light. This does not show that the car will not take me from 
home to work, only that car alone will not do the work. So much about 
Spaulding’s direct challenge to the instructive use of imagination. 
Let me mention, however, that in her text the challenge is preceded 
by a rich and very provocative analysis of one particular kind of imagi-
national enactment, namely simulation. Her argument resembles the 
general one we just summarized. Her example is the following: I watch 
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John tease Mary, and try to fi gure out why he is doing this. I simulate 
his activity, and end up concluding that John likes Mary and is trying 
to get her attention. Fine, but how do I choose this option rather than 
some other, equally plausible in itself, for instance that he is just hu-
miliating her? I need additional information, and my simulation tells 
me nothing about these matters. Again, to me it looks like simulation 
has done the main job, like the car in our example; the fact that the 
main job cannot be fully accomplished by the main agency in question, 
tells little against it.
So much about criticism;17 we had to be very brief. For balance, let 
me conclude this section by mentioning a very helpful and more op-
timistic book, Peter Timmerman’s 2014 Moral Contract Theory and 
Social Cognition who comes very close to our topic with an important 
difference—his is moral contractualism rather than the political one 
(and he says nothing about the psychological mechanism that makes 
accessible to people „other perspectives than their own present point 
of view.”) But he has a lot to say in defense of the view that simulat-
ing oneself in various situations and simulating others are in principle 
within one’s power.
He notes several differences between the kind of perspective-taking 
that normally interest psychologists, and the kind relevant for contract 
theorist. For example, there is the difference in the target (Timmerman 
2014: 36). In contrast to psychologists who are interested in factual 
agreement, “ we need to fi nd out not whether others would in fact agree 
to principles that permit it but whether they have reason to do so. We 
are thus not fi rst and foremost interested in what they would think or 
feel about a principle. We are, however, interested in a closely related 
question. As we need to determine whether others have reason to agree 
to a principle, we are interested in what they would reasonably think 
or feel with regard to the principle. The second difference “concerns the 
sort of perspectives that are considered”. Philosophers are interested in 
general, abstract viewpoints, psychologists in our ability to recognize 
perspectives of “particular others” (Timmerman 2014: 36).
He further distinguishes several variables relevant for moral con-
tract, and his picture can be easily applied apply it to the political one 
(Timmerman 2014: 26ff.). The fi rst variable, he writes, “concerns which 
agents can use the procedure adequately to form moral judgments.” A 
second variable, concerns the circumstances under which agents can 
apply the procedure, and the third the extent of their capacities. For 
all three cases, he comes close to contrasting idealizations and realis-
tic proposals. He has some fi ne ideas about measures that could help 
normal agents to face the daunting task(s). He assumes, (...) that po-
tential interaction partners can detect whether one can be trusted to 
comply or not, and as such will refrain from interacting cooperatively 
with persons who are not disposed to comply.) Also, he argues that 
17 See Klampfer (2018) in this issue.
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we may assume that “persons are able to determine the acceptability 
of principles from other perspectives than their own present point of 
view”. He mentions two important means, information gathering and 
“the internalization of moral principles” to which the biggest part of the 
Chapter Three of the book is dedicated.
Of course, the discussion between PTE-defenders and PTE-skeptics 
is going on, but I think we have no reason to be pessimistic about the 
basic abilities involved in political thought-experimenting. Let me then 
conclude.
3. Conclusion
In our investigation of cognitive mechanisms of PTEs, we have tried 
to bring together two blossoming traditions: the study of perspective 
taking and methodology of thought-experiments. Both are extremely 
rich, but we have narrowed our topics down to PTEs on the side of ex-
periments, and to mental simulation on the side of perspective taking. 
We have discussed the kind of PTEs that has marked the central ten-
dency in a tradition of political philosophy, active at least from Kant on, 
but especially since and including Rawls’ Theory of Justice. It is the ten-
dency to view political justice and moral value in terms of a hypothetical 
contract. Political and moral TEs presented within the contractualist 
tradition (in the widest sense) typically ask the thought-experimenter 
to imagine how other people would take the experimenter’s moral and 
political proposals, how they would feel about them, and whether and 
how they could be persuaded to accept them. A somewhat special but 
perhaps most famous case is imagining what one would propose as po-
litical arrangement if one were ignorant about one’s abilities and mate-
rial situation in the future situation. Again, I apologize for cramming 
together all the famous PTE in the tradition, each of which deserving at 
least a long paper attempting to account for its mechanism; but this is 
the price of arriving at a general pattern, if all goes well.
We have concentrated upon contractualist methodology, where 
imagining is supposed to yield factual intuitions about whether the 
subject(s) in question would accept proposed arrangements, and the 
normative work is done by theory. However, we have noted that there 
is another, more direct route to normative judgements, directly from 
empathy provoked by simulation, explored by a number of cognitive 
psychologists and stressed by Goldman on the side of philosophers; it is 
a matter relevant for sentimentalist ethicists, but also for understand-
ing some very popular TEs, like the Trolley and Fat man ones. Here, 
the appeal to simulation yields a fi ne by-product, a more direct route 
to moral judgment.
How do all these TEs work? Our moderately infl ationist mental 
modelling proposal is that they mobilize our imaginative capacity for 
perspective taking, most probably perspective taking through simula-
tion. The framework proposed is moderately optimistic; it suggests the 
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answers to questions that are often raised for other kinds of TEs as 
well. To quote James Robert Brown, one wonders how one can learn 
new things without new observational data? (Brown 1991: 111ff.). 
In the case of our PTEs, the data come from perspective taking: the 
information producing capacity is either the capacity to simulate or 
some closely related ability. His second worry, why are thought experi-
ments superior to deduction in terms of heuristic power, obviousness 
and ease, can be alleviated or even discarded by appeal to the fact that 
mental simulation is way more accessible to subjects than abstract po-
litical reasoning from principles and facts, and its output is usually 
quite obvious to the subject. The third question is: where does the “ex-
periential” element in thought experiments come from? Are there any 
new experiences or quasi-experiences present in thought experiment, 
and of what nature are they? Yes, it is a new experience, namely the 
experience of simulating. In the case of empathetic simulation, the 
qualitative, emotional character of experience is highly prominent, and 
in the case of less emotional simulation, it still has experiential char-
acter (“Let me imagine that I am a generally incapable person; how 
would I feel in a strongly competitive society, at the bottom of its peck-
ing hierarchy?”). Finally, as Brown puts it “if the reasoning in thought 
experiment is broadly inductive, how can it eliminate alternatives and 
reach its conclusion so quickly and effortlessly, and assert it with such 
force?” (Brown 1991: 111ff.). Simulation normally is quick and effort-
less; the simulator does not go through alternatives, but is constrained 
in an unconscious way.
Let us conclude by placing the account within a bigger picture, re-
turning for the moment to our starting point. We have distinguished 
two kinds of PTEs and two manners of imagining political arrange-
ments. The fi rst consists in building third-person mental models, based 
on our inductive knowledge, and on default assumptions about people, 
about practices and institutional arrangements. The second consists 
in perspective taking, imagining oneself (as oneself or even as some-
one else) and asking about condition one would accept. Golden Rule 
and social contract are prime examples, either in realistic or somewhat 
unrealistic scenarios of ignorance and/or ideal rationality and the like
We have proposed fi rst-person mental simulation as the basic mecha-
nism, although we did not insist on the “purity” of mechanism. (Gold-
man himself proposes the idea of a „hybrid theory” according to which 
the simulation and the reasoning on the bases of theoretical knowledge 
about human minds (theory-of-mind, can interact, for example ‘cooper-
ate’ (ch. 2.7 of his 2006 book); this might be an interesting option, to 
discuss at some other occasion. And of course, simulation might make oc-
casional appearance in the fi rst, predominantly fi rst-person model build-
ing; the author might ask the reader how she would feel in such and such 
an arrangement, something that happens all the time in The Republic. 
But, from a wider perspective, the two mechanisms, model building and 
simulation, and their combination(s) exhaust the range of psychological 
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mechanism underlying political thought-experimenting. This is the am-
bitious proposal to which the present paper is a tentative contribution.
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